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Abstract 
This paper takes up the problem from Stalnaker (1974) of deriving the 
pragmatic presuppositions of verbs such as know, stop and win as 
conversational implicatures, without hypothesizing a semantic 
presupposition.  I interpret data discussed by Karttunen (1969), 
Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990), Simons (2001) and others as 
indicating that there is a distinct group of “soft” presupposition triggers 
whose pragmatic presuppositions, though systematic, are also context-
dependent and easily suspendable.   These are distinguished from 
“hard” presuppositions triggers like it-clefts and too which on the 
assumptions of this paper introduce semantic presuppositions.  These 
distinctions are defended in sections 1 and 2.  Sections 3 and 4 review 
and criticize proposals from Stalnaker (1974) and Simons (2001) for 
deriving the pragmatic presuppositions of soft triggers as 
conversational implicatures.  Section 5 introduces the hypothesis that 
the pragmatic presuppositions of soft triggers come from alternatives to 
lexical meanings, such as the alternative lose to win.  A pragmatic 
presupposition is derived as the default assumption that some 
alternative is true.  In section 6, the default existential presupposition 
of intonational focus is attributed to the same process.  Section 7 
proposes a systematic pragmatic derivation of a conversational 
implicature, using a specific default axiom called G, and a general 
pragmatic process of enrichment reasoning.  Sections 8, 9, and 10 
address the projection problem for the pragmatic presuppositions of 
soft triggers.  It is shown that projection data for these triggers is the 
same as what is seen for hard triggers, which would seem to favor an 
analysis using semantic presuppositions.  The puzzle is resolved by 
replacing G with a default generalization L which refers to the local 
information states manipulated by compositional semantics in dynamic 
compositional theories.  Section 9 also considers general issues of the 
interface between pragmatics and compositional semantics.  Section 11 
shows that the derivation using L also deals with projection data for 
focus.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper is about the presuppositions of verbs like know and stop.  Example (1) 
has a factive implication that the cat is on the mat, and a belief implication that 
John believes that the cat is on the mat.  Implication is used as neutral cover term 
for presuppositions, logical entailments, and conversational implicatures.   
(1) John knows that the cat is on the mat.  
(2) gives two possibilities for the lexical entry of know.  In (2a), the two 
implications are written in as entailments by making them conjuncts.   In (2b) I 
use the partial operator ∂ from Beaver (1995) as a presupposition operator on the 
factive implication.  This makes the factive implication p a semantic 
presupposition.1   
(2) a. p ∧ x believe p   
     b. ∂p ∧ x believe p 
 
I assume that semantic presuppositions are encoded in the semantic values of 
sentences, using truth value gaps or definedness of a file change potentials.2  A 
pragmatic presupposition of an utterance is a proposition p such that in making 
the utterance, the speaker communicates that he takes p to follow from the current 
common ground of shared information (Stalnaker 1974). Typically, if a sentence 
S has a semantic presupposition p, and a speaker asserts S, then the speaker 
pragmatically presupposes p. 
Stalnaker (1974) introduced the project of using the lexical representation 
(2a) without a semantic presupposition, and deriving the pragmatically 
presupposed status of the factive implication by conversational reasoning.  I think 
this project is attractive for what I call soft triggers, which are presupposition 
triggers where the presuppositional behavior is weak and easily suspendable.  
Karttunen (1969) mentioned that it is easy to suspend the factive implication of 
discover.  In typical utterances, (3a) does not pragmatically presuppose that the 
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speaker has not told the truth.  The same holds for (3b) and (3c).  (The examples 
are from Karttunen (1969).)   
(3)  a. Did you discover that you had not told the truth? 
  b. If I discover later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to 
everyone. 
  c. It is possible that I will discover later that I have not told the truth. 
 
Stalnaker pointed out that the pragmatic presupposition of discover correlates 
with contextual factors and indexicality.   I will illustrate this with examples from 
Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990).    (4a) tends to presuppose that Loren is 
now in New York.  But if we switch to the first person as in (4b), the 
presupposition drops out.  Stalnaker takes this as evidence for a pragmatic 
derivation of the presupposition.   And in fact, I find the presupposition even in 
(4a) weak or optional.  
(4) a. If Pavarotti discovers that Loren is now in New York, he will be 
angry.  
  b. If I discover that Loren is now in New York, I’ll be angry.  (Pavarotti 
is speaker.) 
Now I will review a variety of lexical items which I consider soft triggers, 
mainly following the presentation of data in Simons (2001).  These soft triggers 
typically generate pragmatic presuppositions, but they are pragmatic 
presuppositions which are relatively easy to suspend.    
Aspectual verbs like stop and continue pragmatically presuppose the truth 
or falsity of their complements at a time immediately preceding their eventuality 
time.  The presupposition of (5a) is that right before January 1, John smoked.  The 
angle sign marks the pragmatic presupposition.  (5b) shows that the 
presupposition survives negation, and (5c) shows that it survives 
conditionalization.  (5d) is an example where the presupposition is suspended.  
Suppose you receive in the mail a brochure addressed to resident which says (5d).  
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Intuitively, there is no implication that the authors of the brochure take it as 
common ground that you ever smoked.  This connects with the fact that the 
authors of the brochure have very little information about you.  (Example (5d) is 
modified from Kadmon (2001).) 
(5) a.    John stopped smoking on January 1. 
   > Right before January 1, John smoked. 
b.   John didn’t stop smoking. 
c.   If John stops smoking, Mary will buy him a camera. 
d.   In a brochure addressed to resident: 
   If you stopped smoking in 2001, you are eligible for a payment from      
the Tobacco Indemnity Fund. 
I already discussed factives. (6a) and (6b) intuitively presuppose that Mary is 
having an affair, and in (6c) the presupposition is suspended.   
(6) a. John knows that Mary is having an affair.  
 b.  John doesn’t know that Mary is having an affair. 
 c. John suspects Mary is having an affair.  He doesn’t know she is. 
Another group of soft triggers are achievement verbs like win which imply a 
preparatory activity.   (7a) seems to presuppose that Alberto participated in the 
race; this is supported by (7b), where the presupposition survives negation.   This 
presupposition goes away in (7c):  we can use it immediately after Alberto has 
won the 2002 race, without assuming that he is going to participate in the 2003 
race.   
(7) a. Alberto won the race. 
(1) Alberto didn’t win the race. 
> Alberto participated in the race. 
c. If Alberto wins the 2003 Falmouth Roadrace, he will have more 
Falmouth Roadrace victories than anyone else in history. 
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Notice that in this case, the context does not rule out Alberto’s participating in 
the 2003 race, it just suggests that the speaker may be ignorant about the matter.   
 
2.  Differences in suspendability 
 
In this section, I will look at the differences in suspendability between soft and 
hard triggers.  (8) is another example of the suspension of the presupposition of 
stop.  Intuitively, (8) does not presuppose that John used to smoke.  (9) is a 
similar example with continue.  Intuitively, it does not presuppose that John will 
miss the first meeting. However without the disjunction, John will continue 
missing meetings presupposes that he missed meetings before.   
(8) John either stopped smoking, or started smoking. 
(9) After the first meeting, John will either continue missing meetings, or 
continue attending them. 
(10) shows how (9) can be analyzed using local accommodation (Heim 1982, 
1983).  The idea is to fill in the presupposition in each of the conjuncts, so that in 
each conjunct the presupposition of continue is locally satisfied.  With this 
representation the global context does not have to satisfy the presuppositions.  
This fact follows from the general theory of presupposition projection proposed 
by Heim, assuming the representation with local accommodation.  In this analysis, 
this is the reason we intuit that the presuppositions in (9) do not project. 
(10) John will either (have missed the first meeting and) continue missing 
meetings, or (have attended the first meeting and) continue attending 
them. 
I would like to question this analysis by replacing the soft trigger continue with 
the hard trigger too in (11).  The example is quite bad.   In this scenario, if we pay 
attention only to the first two meetings,   John will continue missing meetings and 
John will miss the second meeting too are equivalent in their assertions (that he 
does not attend the second meeting) and their presuppositions (that he did not 
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attend the first meeting).  In the same way, John will continue attending meetings 
is equivalent in its assertions and presuppositions to John will miss the second 
meeting too.    
(11) # After the first meeting, John will either miss the second meeting too, or 
attend the second meeting too. 
Let us repair (11) by local accommodation, exactly like we did in (10).   (12) is 
the locally accommodated version of (11), and here the presupposition of too is 
locally satisfied in each conjunct. 
(12) After the first meeting, John will either (have missed the first meeting and) 
miss the second meeting too, or (have attended the first meeting and) 
attend the second meeting too. 
The problem now is that if both continue and too have semantic presuppositions, 
why is there such a difference in the possibility for local accommodation? Why 
should it be so much easier to locally accommodate the semantic presupposition 
of continue?     
I assume that hard triggers do introduce a semantic presupposition.  Since 
local accommodation is not possible with the hard trigger too in (11), we should 
not analyze the soft trigger continue with a semantic presupposition and use local 
accommodation to deal with (9).   
In (13), I try to improve (11) by adding context which supplies more overt 
antecedents for the propositions presupposed by the two occurrences of too.  The 
example (13a) is still bad. 
(13) John will either attend the first meeting, or miss it.   
a. #? And he will either attend the second meeting too, or miss the second 
meeting too. 
b. And he will either continue attending meetings, or continue missing 
them. 
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In addition to too, I regard also, even, again, negative polarity either, and the it-
cleft as hard triggers.3  My hypothesis is that hard triggers encode semantic 
presuppositions in their semantic values, and that the pragmatic presuppositions 
triggered by soft triggers are easily suspendable and dependent on linguistic and 
extra-linguistic context because they do not come from semantic presuppositions.  
Soft triggers could be analyzed using semantic presupposition and local 
accommodation, but that isn’t the right analysis, because we need to distinguish 
hard triggers from soft triggers.4 
Stalnaker (1974) advocates this hypothesis, or suggests investigating it, 
except that he leaves it open whether there are semantic presupposition triggers. 
Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990) and Simons (2001) advocate the 
hypothesis, and they think there are semantic presupposition triggers.5  To 
develop the hypothesis theoretically, one needs to find analysis of the triggering 
behavior of soft triggers which does not rely on semantic presuppositions.  In the 
next two sections, I will review proposals for this made by Stalnaker and by 
Simons. 
 
3. Stalnaker’s analysis of know 
 
Stalnaker (1974) gives an outline of an analysis of know which I will partially 
paraphrase, and partially quote.  We assume that both the factive implication of 
know and the belief implication are simple entailments.  Consequently, know has 
two conceptually different entailments.  Stalnaker basically says that it is 
confusing for a speaker to use know in a context where both of the entailments are 
at issue.  Suppose a speaker used know and pragmatically presupposed neither the 
factive entailment nor the belief entailment.  (“Suppose a speaker were to use x 
knows P in a context where P is in doubt or dispute.”)  Then he would be “saying 
in one breath something that could be challenged in two different ways.  He 
would be leaving it unclear whether his main point was to make a claim that P” 
(i.e. to assert the factive implication), “or to make a claim about the epistemic 
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situation of x” (i.e. to assert the belief implication).  If the speaker did that, he 
would be violating the presumption of being orderly, not confusing the listener, 
and not violating the reasonable expectations of the listener. 
Both the speaker and hearer can be expected to recognize that it would violate 
maxims of conversation to use know in a context where both entailments are at 
issue.  The hearer can be expected to infer that the speaker assumes the contrary, 
i.e. that one of the entailments is taken for granted.  This gives a pragmatic 
presupposition that the factive entailment is true, leaving the belief entailment as 
the speaker’s main point. 
There are a couple of objections to Stalnaker’s suggestion.  First, the 
reasoning does not explain why the factive entailment rather than the belief 
entailment comes out pragmatically presupposed.  For an utterance of (14), the 
above reasoning leads us to expect either a factive pragmatic presupposition that 
Mary and Bill are having an affair, or a belief pragmatic presupposition that John 
believes Mary and Bill are having an affair.   
(14) John knows that Mary and Bill are having an affair. 
 
The choice between the two possibilities would presumably be made on the basis 
of plausibility in context.  But clearly, only a factive presupposition is observed. 
A second point is that Stalnaker’s reasoning should apply to any verb with 
two conceptually distinct entailments. In (15), sell has two distinct entailments.  
The transfer entailment is that ownership of the bike went from John to Bill.  The 
counter-transfer entailment is that ownership of some money went from Bill to 
John. By Stalnaker’s logic, it would be confusing for the two entailments to both 
be pragmatically asserted. So, one of them should come out pragmatically 
presupposed.  We either have a transfer presupposition (Bill got the bike) or a 
counter-transfer presupposition (John got the money).  But our intuitions are that 
the two entailments are asserted, and neither of them is presupposed.  This is 
supported by (16), where the sentence is conditionalized, and neither implication 
survives.  
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(15) John sold his bike to Bill. 
(16) If John sold his bike to Bill, you can’t use it now. 
# Transfer presupposition:  Ownership of the bike went from John to Bill. 
# Counter-transfer presupposition: Ownership of some money went from 
Bill to John. 
Finally, there are pairs with reversed assertions and presuppositions.  (17) 
and (18) both have a factive implication (Mary and Bill are having an affair) and a 
belief implication (John believes they are).  For know, we want the factive 
implication to come out presupposed, and for be right, we want the belief 
implication to come out presupposed.   It is difficult to see how one can make (17) 
and (18) come out differently, if both have representations like (19) without a 
semantic presupposition. 
(17) John is right that Mary and Bill are having an affair. 
(18) John knows that Mary and Bill are having an affair. 
(19) p ∧ x believe p 
(20) a.   semantically presuppositional know:      ∂p ∧ x believe p    
b.  semantically presuppositional be right:  ∂[x believe p]  ∧ p 
The consequence of this argument is that know and be right have to be 
distinguished somehow in their lexical meanings, in order for their pragmatic 
presuppositions to come out differently.  This can easily be done with semantic 
presuppositions, as in (20). But conceivably, the difference is the additional 
implication of know which has to do with justification for belief, and which is not 
present with be right.  In section 5, I will instead suggest that the distinction 
between know and be right is that they have different alternatives: the alternative 
to be right is be wrong, and the alternative to know is be unaware.6 
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4.   Simons’ analysis   
 
Simons (2001) takes the same perspective on the problem of soft triggers as the 
one I have presented here, and in particular, wants to try to derive the pragmatic 
presupposition of soft triggers conversationally.  She proposes a derivation using 
two generalizations or principles, which are stated and illustrated below.   
(21) Question raising principle (QR)  
If A says S, and S embeds q, then A raises the question whether q. 
(22) Interpretation principle (IP)  
 If A raises the question whether q, and q asymmetrically entails p, then A 
believes p. 
The question raising principle is a principle about a speaker implicitly raising 
questions of discussion.  It says that if A uses a sentence S which has a sub-clause 
q, then A implicitly raises the question whether q.   (23) is an illustrative example.  
The sentence S of QR is (23a), and the embedded clause q is (23b).  According 
to the principle, in using (23a), a speaker A implicitly raises the question (23c).  
In (23d), this question is given in semantic terms as a set of propositions. 
(23) a. John says it is raining. (=S) 
b. It is raining.   (=q) 
c. Is it raining, or not raining? 
d. {rain, ¬rain} 
I think that in this case, question raising has some plausibility.  At least often, a 
speaker of (23a) would intend for (23c) to be a topic of discussion. One can 
object that in other cases, a speaker might have reason to use a sentence 
embedding a clause q while not wanting to raise the question whether q.  Suppose 
you are scheduled for an operation.  When you arrive for it, it develops that your 
specialist is just leaving on a trip, and he tells you (24a).  In this case your 
specialist does not want to raise the question (24b); instead the motivation for 
embedding the information about Dr. Plotkin in a non-restrictive relative clause 
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seems to be to background it, so that you will accept it uncritically.  
(24) a. The operation will be performed by my colleague Dr. Plotkin, who is a 
very experienced surgeon. 
b. Is Dr. Plotkin a very experienced surgeon? 
In (25), principle QR is applied to an example with know.  
(25) A: If John knows Mary is having an affair, then he will avoid the dinner. 
S = [if John knows Mary is having an affair, then he will avoid the dinner]   
q = John knows Mary is having an affair 
S embeds q 
                                                                                                             . 
A raises the question whether q. 
S is A’s entire statement, and q is the embedded clause John knows Mary is 
having an affair.  Since A uses S and S embeds q, according to principle QR, A 
raises the question whether q.   
In Simons’ derivation, principle QR chains together with the second axiom, 
the Interpretation Principle.  It says that if A raises the question whether q, and q 
asymmetrically entails p, then A believes p.  Let us assume this axiom, and see 
how it applies to (25).   By virtue of the decomposition of know I am assuming, q 
is of the form p∧p’, where p and p’ are as defined in (26).   p∧p’ entails p by 
propositional logic, but because p’ is logically independent of p,  p does not entail 
p∧p’.  That is, q asymmetrically entails p.   
(26) p  =  Mary is having an affair 
p’   =  John believes Mary is having an affair 
Now we can reason as in (27), chaining together the interpretation principle with 
the conclusion of question raising. 
(27)   Where q = John knows Mary is having an affair, 
 A raises the question whether q  Conclusion of (25) 
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Where p = Mary is having an affair, 
q asymmetrically entails p   Logic related to (26) 
A believes p     IP 
A believes Mary is having an affair  Definition of p 
This illustrates Simons’ derivation of the pragmatic presupposition of know.  The 
derivation can be criticized in several ways, some of which are pointed out by 
Simons.   First,  as in Stalnaker’s derivation, there is a problem of not predicting 
which entailment comes out pragmatically presupposed.   In the logic above, p 
and p’ are symmetric, so a parallel proof derives p’ as a pragmatic presupposition.   
This problem was noticed by Simons (p. 443), where she points out that a 
derivation along the above lines fails to predict which entailment of stop comes 
out pragmatically presupposed. 
Second, I am skeptical that the Interpretation Principle has any general 
validity.  Consider a version of the sell argument from section 3.  In (28), A 
explicitly raises the question whether John sold his bike to Bill.  John sold his 
bike to Bill has, as asymmetric entailments, that ownership of the bike went from 
John to Bill, and that ownership of some money went from Bill to John.  But in 
this case it is not necessary or even typical that the speaker A either believes that 
ownership of the bike went from John to Bill, or that ownership of some money 
went from Bill to John.7 
(28) A:  Did John sell his bike to Bill? 
Simons gives this motivation for IP: 
 “As a first stab, it seems likely that the relevant relation is (non-mutual) 
entailment.  After all, in all of the cases that we have considered, the 
proposition that displays the projection behavior is an entailment of the 
embedded clause. The significance of entailment seem straightforward: if 
P entails Q, then Q is necessary for the truth of P.  So it would make sense 
to establish the truth of Q before wondering about P.” 
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I do not find this reasoning very convincing.  One could just as well say that it 
makes more sense to try to establish the truth of the more general point P, if one 
can get away with it.   I doubt that the logical relation of entailment could decide 
with any generality whether P or Q becomes a topic of conversation.  It is more a 
matter whether P or Q fits better into a particular context or particular argument. 
Third, I think the derivation using QR and IP is insufficiently tied in with a 
general theory of pragmatics.   It is somewhat unclear how these principles would 
get invoked in conversational reasoning which would derive a conversational 
implicature. 
Finally, there is the problem that the implication which is derived is in fact not 
a pragmatic presupposition, but an implicature about the beliefs of the speaker.  
The conclusion in (27) is that A believes Mary is having an affair, not that this 
information is entailed by the common ground.  So, the derivation does not in fact 
produce a pragmatic presupposition.  
Simons (p. 445) notices this issue, and reacts as follows: 
“On the view of presupposition now most standard in the literature, 
presuppositions are thought to be propositions which must be entailed by 
the presumed common ground of the discourse participants.  However, if 
at least some presuppositions are derived by the kind of mechanism 
which gives rise to other conversational inferences (i.e. conversational 
implicatures), then it is more appropriate to view them as propositions 
which the addressee can infer the speaker to believe on the basis of what 
the speaker has said, plus the assumption that the speaker is behaving 
cooperatively.  On this picture, the derivation of the presupposition may 
require the speaker and addressee to share certain assumptions (e.g. that 
the speaker is behaving cooperatively), but the presuppositions 
themselves are neither required nor expected to be entailed by the 
common ground.” 
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It seems to me that the notion of presupposition being advocated here is 
exactly the standard notion of conversational implicature.  On this terminology, 
even literal content would be presupposed, because (by virtue of the maxim of 
quality) a speaker conversationally implicates the he believes the literal content of 
his utterance.   This is an odd conclusion which effectively denies that there is a 
genuine phenomenon of presupposition, understood in Stalnaker’s sense.   
On the empirical side, my position is that the implications of soft triggers are 
in fact presupposed in the standard sense.  If this is correct, it is a defect in 
Simons’ analysis that it does not derive a presupposition. 
  
5. Lexical Alternatives 
I want to take advantage of the fact that the verbs we are talking about have 
intuitively obvious alternatives.  The alternative to stop is continue, the alternative 
to win is lose, and so forth: 
(29)    
verb alternative              Q 
stop continue {stop, continue} 
win lose {win, lose} 
be right be wrong {be right, be wrong}
know be unaware {know, be unaware}
 
In the right hand column of the table, I group the verb and its alternative into an 
alternative set  Q.  I think of Q as equivalent to the propositional alternative set 
(usually written C) which is used in alternative semantics of focus (Rooth 1992).  
(To avoid confusion, I will not use the notation C for alternative sets, because 
later on, I want to use the notation c for information states.)  My hypothesis is that 
soft triggers contribute an alternative set Q to a discourse representation, but not 
the semantic presupposition that some alternative is true.  Optionally, a speaker 
can pragmatically presuppose that some alternative in Q is true. 
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Consider example (30), which  I assume  refers to a contextual reference 
time r.  The assertion is that John stopped smoking at r.  The corresponding 
alternative is that John continued smoking at r. 
(30) John stopped smoking. 
Q = {John stopped smoking (at r), John continued smoking (at r) } 
Some proposition in Q  is true: 
John stopped smoking at r ∨  John continued smoking at r 
≡ John smoked right before r 
Both alternatives are simple propositions, and encode no semantic 
presuppositions.  Each alternative entails that John smoked right before the 
reference time r.   In general, to pragmatically presuppose that some alternative is 
true is to pragmatically presuppose the disjunction of the alternatives.  The 
disjunction is in this case equivalent to John smoked right before r.  So, if the 
speaker pragmatically presupposes that some alternative is true, he pragmatically 
presupposes that John smoked right before r, which is the observed 
presupposition for (30).   
(31) shows how the derivation works for know and be right.  Both have 
the same denotation, without a semantic presupposition, but they have different 
alternatives: the alternative for x know p is p ∧ ¬x believe p (i.e. unaware), while 
the alternative for x be right that p is ¬p ∧ x believe p (i.e. be wrong).  When we 
take the disjunction of the alternatives, we get p for know, and x believe p for be 
right.  These are the pragmatic presuppositions we want. 
 
(31)   
 denotation alternative disjunction 
x know p p ∧ x believe p p ∧ ¬x believe p p 
x be right that p p ∧ x believe p ¬p ∧ x believe p x believe p 
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Semantic approaches to presupposition have been criticized for stipulating 
results in lexical entries.  Although I am suggesting a more pragmatic approach, it 
has the same degree of stipulation as semantic ones. To get different results for 
know and be right, I have to assume that the different alternatives are lexically 
encoded.  Even if one ultimately wants to say that alternatives are to some extent 
contextually constrained (which seems plausible), there would have to be 
different lexical representations for know and be right to get different alternative 
sets in the two cases. I don’t find the hypothesis that alternative sets are included 
in lexical representations very problematic, particularly since alternative sets are 
used elsewhere in semantics, namely in the semantic of questions and focus.  This 
is a topic which I turn to in the next section. 
There is a certain similarity between my hypothesis that soft triggers introduce 
alternative sets, and Simons’ question raising principle.  A set of alternative 
propositions is a question.  Thus according to both my hypothesis and Simons’ 
question raising principle, an embedded soft trigger introduces a question.  
However, the questions are different.  For Simons, the question introduced by x 
knows p is  
{ p ∧ believe(x,p), ¬ [p ∧ believe(x,p)]}, 
because this is the question whether x knows p. For me, the question introduced 
by x knows p is  
{ p ∧ believe(x,p), p ∧ ¬believe(x,p)}, 
with a narrower scope for the negation.   
 
6.  It-clefts and intonational focus 
The analysis I suggested connects with Rooth’s (1999) comparison of it-clefts and 
intonational focus.  In his football pool scenario, a betting contest called a football 
pool is held in the department, where people bet on the outcome of football 
games.  Consider the exchange below. 
(32) A: Did anyone win the football pool this week? 
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B: Probably not, because it’s unlikely that MaryF won it, and she’s the 
only person who ever wins. 
Rooth’s observation is that focus on Mary does not give an existential 
presupposition ‘someone won the football pool’ which projects to the top level.  
This is clear because A’s question indicates that A does not know whether 
someone won, and so it is not common ground that someone won.  In (33), we 
change the example by substituting an it-cleft for intonational focus.  The result is 
quite bad, and this can be attributed to the it-cleft producing a semantic 
presupposition that projects to the top level.  This presupposition is in conflict 
with the first thing that B says, namely probably not, meaning that probably 
nobody won the football pool. 
(33) A:   Did anyone win the football pool this week? 
B:  #Probably not, because it’s unlikely that it’s MaryF who won it, and 
       she’s the only person who ever wins. 
(34) is a representation for (32) which includes focus interpretation in the 
framework of Rooth (1992).  By virtue of the semantics of focus and of focus 
interpretation, Q is constrained to be a set of propositions of the form ‘x won the 
football pool’.  This set is introduced by focus interpretation. Because focus does 
not express an existential presupposition, there is no semantic presupposition that 
someone won the football pool.  Notice by the way that the scope of the focus is 
the embedded sentence, but focus is justified non-locally, by A’s question. 
 
(34) [probably not, because it’s unlikely that [[MaryF won it]~Q]] 
 
Rooth uses these data as an argument against analyses where intonational 
focus   introduces a semantic existential presupposition.  Instead, he says, focus 
just introduces an alternative set. Extending this point, we can say that focus 
introduces an alternative set, which is turned into a pragmatic existential 
presupposition if the speaker pragmatically presupposes that some alternative is 
true.  This explains why one often has feeling that intonational focus gives rise to 
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an existential presupposition. Exactly like with the soft triggers, this 
presupposition is optional and occurs only when it fits into the context.   So, we 
can regard focus as another soft trigger, which sometimes gives a pragmatic 
presupposition and sometimes not, depending on context. 
  
7.  Pragmatics of the derivation 
 
I want to say that when an alternative set is around in the discourse representation, 
a speaker can optionally make the pragmatic presupposition that some alternative 
is true.  This sounds plausible enough, but more has to be said about it, because it 
does not fall out of the logic of communication that arbitrary pieces of 
information can be presupposed at the whim of the speaker. Why isn’t the 
presupposition something different, such as some alternative being false, or every 
alternative being unpleasant? 
The answer I will develop has to do with the typical role of alternative sets 
in discourses and conversations. Typically, when a question (or equivalently, a set 
of alternative propositions) is under discussion, it is taken for granted that some 
alternative is true, and the participants in the conversation are trying to establish 
which one it is, or to narrow down the possibilities.  One case of this is alternative 
sets which are introduced as the semantic values of questions.  On Hamblin’s 
(1973) semantics for questions, the question who ate the last piece of cake 
introduces the set of propositions  
{ x at the last piece of cake  x is a person} 
as the semantic value of the question.  In most cases where the question is used, it 
would be taken for granted that some alternative is true. 
This typical role for alternative sets in discourse makes it possible for a 
speaker to pragmatically presuppose that some alternative is true, because in a 
context where the presupposition is plausible, the speaker can expect the hearer to 
recognize his intention to make the assumption.    
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I assume there is a general pragmatic phenomenon of communicated 
assumption of default scenarios.  Participants in conversations are aware of 
certain defaults, and a speaker can intend for a hearer to recognize an intention 
that a default is in force.  A hearer will assume that the speaker intends to 
communicate the defaults together with the literal content when the defaults fit 
well into the specific context of use.   Checking fit with the context includes 
checking consistency with the common informational ground and the literal 
content of the sentence, but also a more general evaluation of the plausible 
intentions and plans of the speaker.  I will use the term pragmatic enrichment for 
this general process. 
One case of pragmatic enrichment is conjunction buttressing (Atlas and 
Levinson 1981).  This is the enrichment of conjunctions of eventive sentences 
with causal and temporal predications.  A speaker of (35a) will usually be 
understood as communicating that the falling-over event followed the bumping 
event and was caused by it, in addition to the literal content.  
(35) a. John bumped into me and I fell over. 
b. John bumped into me.  I fell over. 
c. But not because he bumped into me. 
There are a couple of theoretical formulations of pragmatic enrichment.  Atlas 
and Levinson (1981) and Levinson (2000) suggest a Grice-style maxim called the 
I-principle, which I quote from Levinson. 
 
(36) I-Principle (Levinson 2000, p. 114)  
Speaker’s maxim: the maxim of Minimization. “Say as little as necessary”; that 
is, produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your 
communicational ends (bearing Q in mind). 
Recipient’s corollary: the Enrichment Rule.  Amplify the informational content 
of the speaker’s utterance, by finding the most specific interpretation, up to 
what you judge to be the speaker’s m-intended point, unless the speaker has 
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broken the maxim of Minimization by using a marked or prolix expression.  
Specifically: 
a. Assume the richest temporal, causal and referential connections between 
described situations and events, consistent with what is taken for granted. 
b. Assume that stereotypical relations obtain between the referents or events, 
unless this is inconsistent with (a). 
c. Avoid interpretations that multiply entities referred to (assume referential 
parsimony); specifically, prefer co-referential readings of reduced NPs 
(pronouns or zeros). 
d. Assume the existence or actuality of what a sentence is about if that is 
consistent with what is taken for granted. 
 
In the recipient’s corollary, items a. and b. are generalizations of conjunction 
buttressing.   
According to the I-implicature hypothesis, the understood temporal and 
causal relations are not part of the literal content of (35a) or (35b), but are added 
by pragmatic application of the maxim (36).  A status as a conversational 
implicature is supported by the fact that the enrichment can be cancelled by the 
addition of (35c). 
Levinson’s statement of the enrichment seems unnecessarily and implausibly 
strong.  It is not clear why one should think that the most specific extension of 
literal meaning which is consistent with everything else should necessarily be the 
communicated information.  Nevertheless, the general idea that literal content is 
amplified with additional information which fits into the context is convincing.  
The picture is supported by the fact that the same pattern of reasoning comes up 
in non-linguistic behavior. For instance, in the scenario (37a), A is understood as 
silently communicating the information (37b) by non-linguistic (or partially non-
linguistic) means. 
(37) a. A to B: Why don’t you borrow my bike? 
  21 
   (A hands B a key) 
b. This is the key to the lock on my bike. 
As I have already said, I think that the whole process is guided by a system of 
defaults.  At a very general level little more need be said than that speakers and 
hearers assume that literal content is to be amplified by application of default 
axioms and generalizations.   In addition, one needs an account of how default 
axioms apply in interaction with contextual information and literal content, and an 
account of the competition between defaults.  These matters might be addressed 
with a default logic, as extensively investigated by Asher and Lascarides (1993, 
2003).   At the specific level, one needs to hypothesize specific default axioms 
which are responsible for enrichment implicatures. 
My lesson from this consideration of a general framework is that the 
pragmatic presupposition of soft triggers should be based on a default 
generalization which interacts with hypotheses about linguistic form and content 
to generate defeasible implicatures.  I will introduce and illustrate the 
generalization by looking at specific examples involving know.  As an expository 
notation, in (38)-(41) I write a description of the alternative set Q into the logical 
form, next to the sentence which is headed by know.  This corresponds to the 
hypothesis that the lexical entry for know includes a representation of a set of 
alternatives, each of which is obtained by combining a contrasting function (either 
unaware or know) with the same arguments as are used for know in building the 
propositional denotation.  (In this case, these arguments are the complement 
denotation rain, and the subject denotation j.) 
(38) assertion: John knows it is raining. 
alternative: John is unaware it is raining 
Q = {John knows it is raining, John is unaware it is raining} 
    = { rain ∧ j believe rain, rain ∧ ¬j believe rain } 
disjunction of alternatives: rain 
(39) John knows it is raining. 
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 [[John knows it is raining]  
Q = { rain ∧ j believe rain, rain ∧ ¬j believe rain } ] 
(40) John doesn’t know it is raining. 
[not [[John knows it is raining]  
Q = { rain ∧ j believe rain, rain ∧ ¬j believe rain } ]] 
(41) If John knows it is raining, he won’t go outside. 
[If [[John knows it is raining]  
Q = { rain ∧ j believe rain, rain ∧ ¬j believe rain } ] 
[not [he will go outside]]] 
 
The effect of these representations is that the alternative set Q is made available at 
the discourse level.  In each example, Q consists of the two propositions rain ∧ j 
believe rain and rain ∧ ¬j believe rain.  At the discourse level, the alternative set 
Q is interpreted as a question under discussion.   
(42) is the generalization about questions under discussion which will support 
an enrichment implicature.  I assume that Q is a true generalization, and one 
which is known by participants in conversations, so that it can be used in 
enrichment reasoning.  In (43), I specialize (43) to cover specifically those 
questions which are contributed as alternative sets by constituent clauses. 
(42) Generalization Q 
If Q is a question under discussion in an utterance context with informational 
ground c, then typically, c entails that some element of Q is true. 
(43) Generalization G 
If ψ is uttered in a context with informational ground c and ψ embeds a clause 
φ which contributes an alternative set Q, then typically c entails that some 
element of Q is true.  
In these statements, c denotes the global informational common ground for an 
utterance.  In the simplest formal model, c is simply the strongest proposition 
which the conversational participants take for granted.  Equivalently, one can 
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think of c as the conjunction of all the propositions which the participants take for 
granted. 
Suppose any of the sentences (38)–(41) is uttered in a context with 
informational common ground c.  Each of these sentences has a sub-clause which 
contributes the alternative set Q={rain ∧ j believe rain, rain ∧ ¬j believe rain}.  
The application of the default generalization G generates a cancelable implicature 
that c entails that some alternative is true, which I will write c⊧some(Q).  In this 
example, this amounts to a pragmatic presupposition that it is raining. 
What is the general theoretical status of the derivation I have proposed? 
The notion of conversational implicature in the theory of pragmatics refers to 
communicated information which goes beyond literal semantic content.  A core 
case of conversational implicature is the scalar quantity implicature illustrated in 
(44).   A speaker who uses (44a) will normally be understood as conveying the 
additional information (44b), which is known as a conversational implicature of 
(44a).   Or more accurately, the speaker of (44a) is normally understood as 
conveying the additional information (44c), which leaves open the possibility 
that the speaker is uncertain whether John left some parts of the questionnaire 
undone or not. 
(44) a. John completed part of the questionnaire. 
b.  > John did not complete all of the questionnaire. 
c.  > The speaker does not believe that John necessarily completed all of 
the questionnaire. 
My derivation for c⊧some(Q) shares the criterial properties of defeasibility 
and calculability with scalar quantity implicatures, and other core cases of 
conversational implicature. Calculability is the property of being derived in a 
systematic way by reasoning about literal meaning, speaker’s intentions, 
discourse structure, and so forth.   Enrichment reasoning using G has the status of 
a calculation of the information c⊧some(Q).  Defeasibility of the implicature 
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results from the default status of generalization G.  Although G holds 
stereotypically and in most cases, it does not always hold.  In the presence of 
contrary information (in particular if the discourse context makes the added 
information implausible) the implicature can be suspended.   
For these reasons, it is appropriate to call c⊧some(Q) a conversational 
implicature of utterances of the sentences (38)-(41).  The implicature has a 
presuppositional status, because it states a condition on the global common 
ground c.  This contrasts with most implicatures, which have an asserted status.  
For instance, it is clear that the scalar implicature in (44) is additional information 
the speaker conveys, rather than information he suggests is already a consequence 
of the common ground. 
That conversational implicatures can have a presupposed status has been 
pointed out by Kadmon: 
 
“On the terminology I have adopted, these implications are in fact pss 
[presuppositions].  That is because the intuition is not merely that it is implied 
that [a certain proposition] is true, but rather that it is implied that the 
proposition in question is being taken for granted.” 
--- Kadmon (2001), p. 210. 
Note that in the formal model, being taken for granted is formalized as being 
entailed by the common ground c.  In contrast, ordinary conversational 
implicatures relate to another complex of attitudes including the belief attitude of 
the speaker. 
Grice’s work on conversational implicature introduced the notion of a 
generalized conversational implicature, which is a conversational implicature 
which is derivable without reference to properties of a particular context (Grice 
1967, 1975).  Levinson (2000) argues that generalized conversational implicatures 
(GCIs) should be given a distinguished theoretical status.  Since my derivation of 
the pragmatic presupposition of know relies on general properties of topical 
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questions in discourse, the implicature of know and other soft triggers on my 
account are GCIs, if this indeed is a distinct theoretical category. 
Theories of pragmatics have suggested general patterns of derivation for 
implicatures, such as quantity implicatures (Grice 1967, Grice 1975, Horn 1972) 
and relevance implicatures (Sperber and Wilson 1986).  Putting aside differences 
between an account based on defaults and one based on the I-principle, my 
derivation of the pragmatic presupposition of soft triggers falls into the class of I-
inferences in the typology offered by Levinson (2000).  He characterizes 
informativeness reasoning from the recipient’s perspective as “what you haven’t 
bothered to say, you expect me, the recipient, to supply” (Levinson 2000, p. 121).  
In these terms, a speaker of a sentence which embeds John knows it is raining 
uses a logical form which presents the alternative set {rain ∧ j believe rain, rain ∧ 
¬j believe rain }, but he does not bother to say that he assumes a common ground 
which entails that some alternative in the set is true.  But the speaker expects the 
recipient to supply the information, because alternative sets in discourse typically 
have this property. 
Summarizing the technical proposal of this section, a soft trigger 
contributes an alternative set to the discourse representation.  Such alternative sets 
are typically interpreted as topical in the discourse. There is a default axiom that 
the informational common ground for an utterance entails the disjunction of such 
an alternative set.  The pragmatic presupposition of the soft trigger is derived by 
enrichment reasoning, based on the default generalization.  The presupposition 
has the theoretical status of a conversational implicature, and is suspendable (and 
therefore soft in my descriptive terminology) because of the default character the 
generalizations Q and G about alternative sets. 
  
8.  Compositional interactions 
 
There is a group of observations about the presupposition projection which are 
considered characteristic of semantic presupposition, because simple and 
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explanatory accounts of them have been given in compositional semantic 
accounts using semantic presupposition (Karttunen 1973, 1974, Heim 1983).  One 
case is the transformation of presuppositions in conditionals. In isolation, (45) 
presupposes that John has twins; this presupposition q′  comes from the definite 
description.8  In a conditional context (46), the presupposition q′ is transformed to 
p→q’, where p is the assertion of the if-clause (in this case, that John has 
children).9,10 
(45) Mary does not like John’s twins. 
> John has twins. (presupposition q′ ) 
(46) If John has children, then Mary will not like his twins. 
> If John has children then he has twins. (presupposition p→ q′) 
This transformation of presuppositions is explained in a dynamic compositional 
account using semantic presuppositions (Heim 1983).  The potential problem for 
my analysis is that when we check similar examples with soft triggers, the data 
come out in the same way, with conditional weakening of the presupposition. 
Here is an example with stop.   
(47) John has stopped smoking Luckies.  
 >  At some past time, John smoked Luckies. 
(48) If John ever smoked, then he has stopped smoking Luckies.  
 > If John ever smoked, then at one time he smoked Luckies. 
It seems clear to me that the presupposition that John used to smoke Luckies is 
conditionally weakened in the way shown in (48).  Imagine it is taken for granted 
that John is one of a group of friends who, if they ever smoked, started smoking 
as teenagers, and started with Luckies.  Then the stronger presupposition that John 
once smoked is not supported in context, but the weaker one in (48) is supported.  
Sentence (48) is fine in this context, which indicates that the presupposition has 
been conditionally transformed.  If conditional weakening is characteristic of 
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semantic presupposition, this behavior appears to be evidence for a semantic 
treatment of the presupposition of stop.    
Another compositional interaction is trapping by bound variables in 
quantified contexts. This is discussed in van der Sandt (1992); see also the 
discussion of the argument in Beaver (1997).  In (49), the subject of stop is a 
quantified noun phrase everyone in the house.  As a consequence, the alternatives 
generated by stop have a bound variable in them, as shown in the description of Q 
in the last part of the labeled bracketing.11 
(49) Everyone in the house stopped smoking. 
 [everyone in the house]2  
[e2 stopped smoking Q = { x2  smoke before r and x2 stop smoking at r, 
          x2 smoke before r and x2 smokes at r}]] 
 
The problem for my analysis is that there is no single value for Q at the utterance 
level.  This makes it unclear how the pragmatic derivation from section 7 should 
deal with the example, since it talks about alternative sets which are topical at the 
discourse level.   
These two problems (presupposition projection and trapping by bound 
variables) are similar, because they involve interactions with compositional 
semantics.  Accounts which assume lexical semantic presuppositions have the 
resources to deal with them, because they manipulate denotations which encode 
presuppositions.  Furthermore, since the problems have to do with what is 
happening at embedded levels in the sentence, they seem to involve compositional 
semantics, rather than pragmatics.  And finally, these phenomena have been 
analyzed in the literature on semantic presupposition, and some of the analyses of 
presupposition projection are compellingly simple.  How could a pragmatic 
account do as well? 
I will deal with this puzzle by formulating the pragmatic account in 
dynamic semantic terms, taking advantage of the same dynamic compositional 
interactions which are used in semantic accounts of presupposition projection.   
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I take it as axiomatic that the basic communicative act which is involved 
in pragmatic presupposition relates to a global common ground.  To make a 
pragmatic presupposition is to communicate that one believes the common ground 
to have such-and-such entailments.  Thus making a pragmatic presupposition is a 
global communicative act.  On the other hand, in the case of the compositional 
phenomena above, it seems that one has to consider what information is available 
in a local compositional context.  This is what semantic theories do when they 
check semantic presuppositions against a local information state (Heim 1983, 
1991).  This creates a tension between the global and local information levels. 
To resolve the tension, I will use a strategy one could call  think locally, 
act globally.  The strategy is also used in David Beaver’s work on 
accommodation (Beaver 1994).  Whether some alternative is true will be checked 
against a local context, instead of a global context.  But the act of making a 
pragmatic presupposition will still be global. 
In the examples below, c is the global context (an information state or file) 
for the sentence which embeds know, and d is the corresponding local context for 
the clause headed by know.  The local context d is determined by c and by 
compositional semantic rules.  The point of the examples is to argue that in 
typical uses in a global context c of a sentence S embedding know, the 
corresponding local context d for know entails that some proposition in the 
alternative set determined by know is true.  This will be abbreviated d⊧some(Q). 
These examples will motivate a generalization similar to G which refers to both a 
global common ground c and a local information state d.  This generalization L 
will replace G in enrichment reasoning. 
The first example (50) is a negation.  In this compositional environment, 
know introduces the alternative set Q given at the end in the labeled bracketing.  
The fourth line gives the compositional semantic rule for negation from Heim 
(1983).  When the rule is applied to this case, ϕ is the clause headed by know.  
The local context for know is read off the file change rule: it is the expression on 
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the left of ‘+’ in the sub-expression (c + ϕ).  In other words, the local context for 
know in this case is the global context c.  This is stated on the bottom line in the 
example. 
(50)  John doesn’t know it is raining. 
[not [ John know it is raining 
Q = { rain ∧ believe(j,rain), rain ∧ ¬believe(j,rain)} ]] 
File change rule: c+ ¬ϕ = c – (c + ϕ) 
d=c 
I assume that, typically, the alternative set Q in such examples is construed 
as  topical at the discourse level, and that as above, when an alternative set is 
topical, it is typically presupposed that some alternative is true.  Putting these 
together, in a typical use of such negated examples, we have c⊧some(Q), where c 
is the global context.  Since the local context d for know equals the global context 
c,  d⊧some(Q). 
Notice that in this reasoning, it is important that Q is (or can be) 
interpreted as a topical question, even though it is introduced in an embedded 
position.  This connects with what I said about the focus example (32), where an 
alternative set introduced at an embedded level is justified at the discourse level, 
in that case by the question. 
 In the next example, know is embedded in the if-clause of a conditional.  
The reasoning is as in the previous example.  In the file change rule for the 
conditional from Heim (which actually is a dynamic rule for a material 
implication), the local context d for ϕ is the global context c.  Reasoning as 
before, in typical uses of sentences with this kind of embedding for know, 
d⊧some(Q). 
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(51)  If John knows it is raining, he won’t arrange to go out for lunch.  
[if [John knows it is raining  
Q = { rain ∧ believe(j,rain), rain ∧ ¬believe(j,rain)}] 
[he won’t arrange to go out for lunch]] 
File change rule: c+ if ϕ then ψ = c – (c + ϕ – c + ϕ + ψ) 
d=c 
In this reasoning, it is important that Q, which is introduced as an embedded 
position, can be a topic of conversation at the global level.  I think that in this 
case, it is plausible to maintain that in a conversation where (51) is used, Q is a 
question under discussion at the discourse level. 
In (52), know is in the main clause of the conditional, instead of the if-clause.  
I think that intuitively, the alternative set Q has the same status as in the previous 
examples: the example fits into a discourse where Q is topical, and typically it 
would be assumed that some alternative is true.   
(52) If John has been outside, he knows it is raining. 
          [If John has been outside 
         [he knows it is raining   
      Q = { rain ∧ believe(j,rain), rain ∧ ¬believe(j,rain)}]]  
d = c + John has been outside 
In this case, I do not want to say that it is necessarily typical of uses of sentences 
with this general pattern of embedding that some alternative in Q is true.  The 
reason is that in examples like (53), it is debatable whether Q is topical at the 
discourse level, and it is clear that at the discourse level, it is not presupposed that 
some alternative is true.  That is, it is not presupposed that it is raining. 
(53) If it is raining, then John knows it is raining. 
So, I will say something weaker to cover (52): when know is embedded in the 
main clause of a conditional, then frequently the associated alternative set Q is 
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topical in the discourse, and it is assumed that some alternative is true.  In such 
cases, we can reason as follows.   The file change rule for the conditional is  
c+ if ϕ then ψ = c – (c + ϕ – c + ϕ + ψ) 
and therefore the local context for ψ is c + ϕ, i.e. c+John has been outside.  In a 
context where Q is topical and where the global information state c entails that 
some alternative is true, we also have c+John has been outside⊧some(Q).  Since d 
= John has been outside, d⊧some(Q).  This reasoning relies on d being an 
extension of c. 
Taken together, these examples support the following generalization. 
(54) If ψ is uttered in a context with informational ground c and ψ embeds a 
clause φ of the form x knows p,  then typically, the local context d for φ 
entails that some proposition in the alternative set {p ∧ believe(x,p), p 
∧ ¬believe(x,p)} is true, that is d⊧some(Q).  
As I have justified it, the generalization follows from the alternatives suggested 
by know, not from a semantic presupposition of know.  I am assuming that know 
has no semantic presupposition. 
Let us return for a moment to (53).  This is an example where it is not 
particularly plausible that Q (the question whether it is raining and John believes 
it is raining, or it is raining and John does not believe it is raining) is a question 
under discussion at the discourse level.  Nevertheless, a use of (53) is an positive 
case for the generalization (54).  Because of the file change rule stated above, the 
local context d in this case is c + it is raining.  This entails the disjunction of the 
propositions in Q (that is, d⊧some(Q), as required in (54)), because this 
disjunction is simply the proposition that it is raining.  This kind of example is a 
positive case for the generalization (54) for compositional-semantic reasons, not 
because of any typical properties of the global context.  Notice by the way that 
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(53) is a classic case of presupposition filtering, for a theory where know has a 
semantic presupposition. 
Now I want to derive the pragmatic presupposition.  Basically, I want to argue 
that the situation of the local context d entailing p is so typical that it carries over 
to other cases.  Suppose that a speaker A uses any of the sentences S above which 
embed x know p.   The hearer B is unsure whether the global context c is such that 
the corresponding local context d for x know p entails p.  But B takes A’s 
utterance as an indication that A thinks the global context is like that. B silently 
accommodates the assumption. 
A speaker can expect a listener to reason in this way.  That is, a speaker can 
expect a listener to assume that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 
global context c is such that the corresponding local context for x know p entails 
p.  This gives a default pragmatic presupposition that the global context for S is 
such that the corresponding local context for x know p entails p.12 
To restate this as enrichment reasoning, we need a default axiom which 
captures the dependency between c and d.  This default axiom is (54).  Here is a 
statement in general form. 
(55) Generalization L:  If a sentence ψ is uttered in a context with common 
ground c and ψ embeds a clause φ which contributes an alternative set Q, 
then typically c is such that the corresponding local context d for φ entails 
that some element of Q is true.  
 
The phrase “corresponding local context” refers to the correspondence 
between global and local contexts which is established by compositional 
semantics.  Given a fixed disambiguated LF and a global context c, the local 
context d is uniquely determined.  So even though L mentions a local context, it is 
still a constraint on the global context c.  Therefore it can be used in enrichment 
reasoning to generate a presuppositional conversational implicature.  Using L 
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instead of G will have consequences for the specific pragmatic presupposition 
which is generated.  The consequences are worked out in the next section. 
But first some more about L.  When I justified it, I looked just at examples 
involving know.  Similar examples can be given with other soft triggers.  And in 
the positive cases I looked at, some(Q) was either entailed by the global common 
ground, or was entailed by the local information state d for compositional-
semantic reasons.  There are other cases (to which we turn immediately) where 
some(Q) is entailed by the local information state d because of a combination of 
information in the common ground, and information which is added by 
compositional semantics. These are another bunch of positive cases for the 
generalization.  And as with G, it could even be that L is just a robust statistical 
generalization for which no general justification such as the one I attempted above 
can be given.  All that matters for my derivation is that the generalization L is 
assumed by speakers and hearers, so that it can be used in enrichment reasoning.   
 
9.  The compositional contribution to pragmatically triggered presuppositions 
 
Here is the conditional weakening example which was discussed earlier, where 
we see the projection behavior which we used to think was characteristic of 
semantic presupposition. 
 
(56) If John ever smoked, then he has stopped smoking Luckies. 
> If John ever smoked, then at one time he smoked Luckies. 
 
By the method of the previous section, we derive the following condition on a 
common ground c. 
 
(57) c is such that the corresponding local context d for he has stopped smoking 
Luckies entails that John once smoked Luckies. 
 
Using the compositional derivation for (56), we find that the corresponding local 
context d is c + John once smoked.  So, the condition is equivalent to (58). 
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(58) Constraint on c derived by enrichment reasoning using Generalization L 
and the logical form of (56). 
 c + John once smoked entails that John once smoked Luckies 
 
Notice first that this is a presuppositional conversational implicature.  It is 
presuppositional because it describes an entailment of the global common ground 
c.  In Stalnaker’s conception, pragmatic presuppositions are precisely 
communicated constraints on common grounds.  For this consequence to come 
out, it is crucial that even though L also refers to a local information state, it is 
interpretable as a default constraint on the global common ground.  Second, (58) 
is a conversational implicature because it is communicated information going 
beyond literal content, which is derived in a systematic way using conversational 
reasoning. 
(58) agrees with the presupposition which is perceived intuitively.    It is also 
the same presupposition which is derived on an account which says that stop 
encodes a semantic presupposition in its lexical meaning.  I assume that hard 
triggers like clefts do introduce semantic presuppositions, and for them 
presupposition projection looks the same as for soft triggers.  So, the analysis 
derives the same projection behavior for hard and soft triggers.  The reason this 
happens is that both the semantic and pragmatic derivations check something 
(either the truth of a semantic presupposition, or some alternative being true) 
against a local context d which is obtained (in exactly the same way in the two 
cases) from a global context c and dynamic compositional semantics. 
There is discussion in the literature which says that this result is desirable. 
Chierchia and McConnell Ginet (1990) say that semantically and pragmatically 
triggered presuppositions should be filtered or transformed in the same way by 
dynamic compositional semantics: 
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(CM)  While there can be two sources of presuppositions, we 
would expect that their projection properties are the same since the 
context-change potential of non-atomic sentences is independent of 
how the presuppositions of atomic sentences are triggered.  
(Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, p. 313) 
There is perhaps something puzzling about what Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 
suggest here.  The pragmatic reasoning which derives conversational implicatures 
is reasoning about utterances.  This is particularly clear in the case of reasoning 
about common grounds, which are features of utterance context. How could 
dynamic compositional semantics, which assembles denotations of parts of an 
utterance into an utterance denotation, have the chance to filter a presupposition 
which is derived from conversational reasoning about an utterance denotation?  
It would be a mistake to think that this point is automatically countered by the 
fact that current theories use dynamic semantic objects for both compositional 
semantics and pragmatics, or that the information states which are used in 
dynamic compositional semantics are sometimes called “hypothetical contexts.”   
The d’s of the previous section are information states used in compositional 
semantics; they are not utterance contexts.  Therefore pragmatic arguments do not 
automatically apply to them in the same way as they apply to common grounds. 
Kadmon (2001, p. 216) expresses an opinion related to (CM): 
(K)  Secondly, if you want to ask why it is that the conversationally 
triggered pss [presuppositions] of complex sentences should 
systematically involve local contexts, that question is independent 
of simply applying the filtering projection theory in order to 
predict the right pss.  After all, when we applied filtering to 
conventionally triggered pss, that didn’t explain why they 
systematically involved local contexts, either.  We never used the 
mode of triggering in order to explain why the local contexts were 
crucial. 
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Thirdly, on further reflection, it does not seem so strange that 
conversationally triggered pss should depend on their local 
context.  After all, each clause is uttered in its local context – isn’t 
it natural to assume that it is required to be relevant in that local 
context? 
 
I mainly disagree with Kadmon’s reasoning here.  I do think that dynamic 
compositional theories explain or rationalize projection behavior for semantic 
presuppositions, as was originally claimed in Heim (1983).  In particular, that 
framework gives a deep explanation for sensitivity to local contexts. The file 
change rule (59) for the material implication states the semantics of the 
construction, but also determines local contexts for φ and ψ.  The syntax of this 
file change formula together with the interpretation of semantic presupposition as 
a definedness condition of the file change potentials denoted by clauses makes the 
sensitivity to local context and the specific filtering behavior fall out.  In this 
sense the architecture of the dynamic framework for semantic presupposition 
explains why local contexts are crucial.   
(59) c + if φ then ψ= c – [c+φ - c+φ+ψ] 
 
Notice that this point is not harmed by the argument in Soames (1989) against 
the claim in Heim (1983) that the specific projection behavior of lexical items is 
derivable from their non-presuppositional compositional semantics.  It is possible 
to write down other file change rules for the material implication which 
correspond to the same operations on truth values or on propositions, but which 
have different local contexts for the constituent clauses, for instance  (60).   
(60) c + if φ then ψ =  c – [c+φ - c+ψ]  
 
With the different file change rules, we get different presupposition projection 
behavior, because the local contexts are different. This is a counterexample to the 
claim in Heim (1983) that projection behavior follows from non-presuppositional 
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meaning, but does not matter for the point I am making here. Also with the 
second file change rule for if-then, presupposition satisfaction and transformation 
are sensitive to local information states.  So, contrary to Kadmon, semantic 
presupposition theory does provide an explanation for sensitivity to local contexts 
in filtering behavior. 
Second, I do not agree that “each clause is uttered in its local context” in the 
same way that a sentence is uttered in an utterance context.  Local information 
states in dynamic semantics are devices which are used for stating compositional 
semantics---they do not have the status of contexts of utterance.  For instance, I 
would not see the sense in saying that the utterance of ψ  in the context if φ then 
__ takes place in a context where the speaker takes it as granted that the speaker 
and hearer’s common store of information entails φ. Instead, I would think that 
the context of utterance for ψ in this case is roughly the same as the context of 
utterance for if φ then ψ, perhaps with some slight additions, such as the 
information that if φ then__ has just been uttered.  But I should not overemphasize 
this objection, since my account does use the notion of a local context for an 
embedded clause containing a soft trigger.  This is the information state which is 
obtained by updating the assumed global information state with the function from 
global contexts to local contexts which is determined by compositional 
semantics.13  If we wanted to, we could adopt Kadmon’s language, and say that 
the embedded clause is uttered in this context.   The only point is that this local 
context does not have the same status as a global common ground, so there is no 
reason to expect that pragmatic reasoning would apply to it in the same way that 
pragmatic reasoning applies to global common grounds. 
Summing up, I do not agree with Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet and 
Kadmon that current theories of semantics and pragmatics generate general 
expectations that pragmatic presuppositions which do not have an origin in 
semantic presuppositions should be transformed in the same way by 
compositional semantics as semantic presuppositions, or that pragmatic 
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presuppositions which do not have an origin in semantic presuppositions should 
be systematically sensitive to local contexts.14  If anything, I think the general 
expectation created by current theories of semantics and pragmatics is the 
opposite. Of course, I have proposed a theory which predicts parallel 
filtering/transformation behavior for semantic presuppositions and the pragmatic 
presuppositions generated by enrichment reasoning using L.  But this prediction 
depends on the specifics of the derivation, and in particular on the formulation of 
L. 
 My solution to the compositional puzzle is significantly different from what 
is suggested in (CM).  In my solution, the pragmatics does not generate a 
presupposition which is filtered or transformed by compositional semantics.  
Instead, the pragmatic logic is artfully set up so that the pragmatic presupposition 
which is generated in the first place is already sensitive to compositional 
semantics.   This explains how my solution avoids the problem I stated about 
(CM), namely that it does not make sense for compositional semantics to filter 
presuppositions which are generated by pragmatic reasoning about utterances.  In 
the derivation using L, compositional semantics does not, strictly speaking, filter 
or transform presuppositions which have been pragmatically generated.   Instead, 
as in standard models of the semantics-pragmatics interface, semantics is the input 
to pragmatics, and aspects of the semantics have consequences for what is derived 
pragmatically. 
There is one way in which my model of the semantics/pragmatics interface is 
non-standard: the derivation assumes that a lot of the compositional semantics is 
visible to pragmatics. Generalization L refers to an embedded information state d.  
If we just have the semantic value of the sentence (a certain dynamic proposition 
or file change potential), it is not possible to apply the condition, because to apply 
it, one has to find the d which corresponds to the global c.  It seems that  to apply 
the condition, one has to have access to something like a structured proposition 
(Lewis 1972) which stores the pieces from which the semantic value is composed.  
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This structured dynamic proposition is used to find the local context d for the soft 
trigger, given the global context c.  Here the semantics is being used to supply a 
function from global contexts to local contexts, rather than just the function from 
global input information states to global output states which is the semantic value 
of a sentence in dynamic semantics.   This idea is developed in the next section.  
The discussion above of the interaction between compositional semantics and 
conversational implicature is clouded by Chierchia’s more recent work on scalar 
implicature (Chierchia 2004).   He argues that scalar implicatures (or whatever 
one calls them, implications which look like scalar implicatures) can be generated 
in embedded contexts where they are not motivated by global scalar reasoning.  
These embedded scalar implicatures are then compositionally modified.  (61) and 
(62) are examples quoted from Chierchia’s paper. 
(61) (Right now) Mary is either working at her paper or seeing some of her 
students.   
> Mary is either working at her paper or seeing some (though not all) of 
her students. 
(62) John knows that some students are waiting for him. 
> John knows that some though not all students are waiting for him. 
 Sauerland (2004) shows that some of Chierchia’s data can be accommodated 
in a classic approach, where scalar implicatures are generated at a global level by 
checking entailment relations between the denotation of a root sentence to the 
denotations of alternative assertions.  This becomes possible when the appropriate 
set of alternatives to sentences with Boolean connectives are considered. For 
instance it is necessary to consider p an alternative to p or q.   However, it is not 
clear that this approach would extend to all of Chierchia’s data. 
Chierchia proposes an algorithm which generates certain strengthened 
meanings by a recursive procedure which manipulates alternative denotations.  He 
is frank in pointing out that this procedure has not been motivated by systematic 
pragmatic reasoning: 
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What emerges from these considerations is that if we look at it more 
closely, the idea that implicatures are computed globally (after the root 
sentence has been assigned its basic meaning by the grammar) seems to 
face empirical difficulties.  Hence, it seems wrong to take such an idea as 
the null hypothesis, in spite of its many prima facie desirable features.  In 
all of the cases we have discussed above, one can try various moves, if one 
feels that the globalist view ought to be preserved.  But we need theories 
of implicature more articulated than those currently available in order to 
assess the actual viability of the globalist view, rather than taking it for 
granted.  (Chierchia 2004, p. 47) 
So, Chierchia is proposing an empirically motivated theory which, in the form 
that he is proposing it, is not derived from any pragmatic logic of the standard 
global sort.  From one point of view, this could be seen as undermining my 
discussion above of how the theory proposed in this paper fits in with general 
accounts of compositional semantics and conversational implicature.  Chierchia’s 
proposal says that there are recursive processes which generate what look like 
implicatures by a process which is not reducible to global pragmatics.  If this was 
right, it would make the views (CM) and (K) more plausible, and it would not be 
correct to argue against these views based on the premise that conversational 
implicatures must be derived by global pragmatic reasoning.  On the other hand, 
Chierchia’s proposal can be regarded as incomplete, because it has not yet been 
tied in with a general pragmatic theory, and so it is not possible to say whether it 
tends to support or tends to undermine my proposal for deriving pragmatic 
presuppositions using enrichment reasoning.   Perhaps it would be possible to 
identify a default generalization similar to L which would make Chierchia’s 
algorithm for scalar strengthening fall out.   In that case, these scalar implicature 
phenomena would fit in with my proposal and my assumptions about the 
semantics-pragmatics interface, rather than undermining them. 
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10.  Local contexts in a detailed derivation 
This section develops a detailed derivation of the example repeated in (63).  
The goal is to explore the question of how much semantic information the 
pragmatics must have to apply generalization L, and also to check that the 
analysis using alternatives discussed in earlier sections can be put together with 
the dynamic framework mentioned in Section 9. 
(63) If it is raining, then John knows it is raining. 
 (64) is the compositional structure I will use.  There are two CP clauses, 
which are arguments of an implicit operator op which has the conditional 
meaning. 
(64)   
S
CP
op CP
then S
if S
NP VP
it is raining
John
V CP
knows it is raining  
To state the semantics, I will use the file increment notation for dynamic semantic 
rules from Heim (1983) and Heim (1991).   The semantics for know will be based 
on the semantics for believe from Heim (1991).  This semantics is stated in (65), 
and some notation is reviewed in (66).  The plus operation ‘+’ combines an 
information state (file) on the left with an information-state function (file change 
potential) on the right to produce another information state.  The semantics for 
believe is stated in terms of a set of epistemic alternatives bx,w for the individual x 
in a world w.  The lexical semantics for believe defined in (65) preserves those 
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worlds w in c such that incrementing bx,w with the file change potential ψ which is 
the denotation of the complement sentence eliminates no worlds.  Heim (1991) 
argues that this rule does a good job of predicting the presupposition-projection 
properties of believe.   
 
(65) Context change rule for believe 
 c + x believe ψ = {w|c(w) ⋀ bx,w+ψ=same} 
(66) bx,w  set of epistemic alternatives for x in w  
   (a set of possible worlds) 
 d +ψ = same abbreviation for d +ψ =d 
   (updating d with ψ eliminates no worlds) 
 d +ψ ≠ same abbreviation for d +ψ ≠d 
   (updating d with ψ eliminates some worlds) 
 
The earlier discussion of know and its alternative used the representations in (67).  
We want to put these representations into dynamic form, using the semantics (65) 
for the believe component.  All that is necessary is to insert the factive implication 
into the context change rule for believe. This is done by substituting ψ(c)(w), or 
equivalently [c+ψ](w) for c(w).  (68a) is the resulting context change rule for 
know.  Keeping constant the conjunct which represents the factive implication, 
while negating the other conjunct, results in the file change rule (68b) for the 
alternative to know. 
(67) a.  know 
      p ∧ x believe p  
 b. alternative to know  
      p ∧ ¬[x believe p] 
(68) a. Context change rule for know 
    c + x believe ψ = {w|ψ(c)(w) ⋀ bx,w+ψ=same} 
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 b. Context change rule for alternative to know 
    c + x believe ψ = {w|ψ(c)(w) ⋀ bx,w+ψ≠same} 
Inserting appropriate lambda binders in (68a) lets us work out the derivation for 
the main clause in (63).  The alternative meaning for the clause is given at the 
bottom.  This comes from using the denotation for the alternative to know in place 
of the denotation of know in the compositional derivation. 
(69)    Derivation for John knows it is raining  
λcλw[c(w) ∧ rainw ∧ λw′[bj,w(w′) ∧ rainw′] = bj,w]
j λxλcλw[c(w) ∧ rainw ∧ bx,w + λdλw′[d(w′) ∧ rainw′] = same]
λψλxλcλw[ψ(c)(w) ∧ bx,w + ψ = same] λdλw′[d(w′) ∧ rainw′]
alternative: λcλw[c(w) ∧ rainw ∧ λw′[bj,w(w′) ∧ rainw′] = bj,w]  
  
The next step is to apply a dynamic semantic rule for the conditional.  (70) repeats 
the context change rule from Heim (1983) for if-then (or in the tree (64), for op).  
This can be understood as a dynamic material implication.   When we combine it 
with the results from (69), we get the derivation (71) for the compositional 
structure (64). 
(70) Context change rule for if-then 
 c + if ϕ then ψ = c – [c+ϕ – c+ϕ+ψ] 
(71)  Semantic derivation for if it is raining, then John knows it is raining   
λc[c− [λw[c(w) ∧ rainw]− [
d
︷ ︸︸ ︷
λw[c(w) ∧ rainw] +ψknow]]
λψλc[c− [λw[c(w) ∧ rainw]− [λw[c(w) ∧ rainw] + ψ]] ψknow
λφλψλc[c− [c + φ− c + φ + ψ]] λdλw[d(w) ∧ rainw]
global to local function: λcλw[c(w) ∧ rainw] (= λc.d)  
The lambda term at the top in (71) names the denotation of the compositional 
structure; it is a certain function from information states to information states. The 
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bracketed term labeled d is the “local context” for the denotation of the clause 
headed by know.  Operating syntactically, we can read off a function from global 
common grounds to local information states from this lambda term as the function 
λc.d.  This function is given at the bottom in (71).   
(72) gives the semantic types for phrases in (69) and (71) which we get if we 
assume that files are propositions.  The clause headed by know has the type (st)st, 
which is the type of functions from propositions to propositions.  The alternative 
to the clause has the same type.  (73) works out the type of the alternative set Q, 
and the operator some which quantifies over the alternative set.  The alternative 
set Q is a characteristic function of a set of alternatives.15  Since an alternative has 
type (st)st, this type is ((st)st)t.   The operator some in some(Q) turns Q into a file 
change potential (function from propositions to propositions).  This operator is 
defined at the bottom in (73). 
(72) The denotation for a clause is a function from information states to 
information states.   
Information states are propositions, type st.   
A dynamic clause denotation has type (st)st, a function from propositions 
to propositions.  
Semantic types in the trees above: 
c,d  st 
rain  st 
know ((st)st)e(st)st    
ψknow  (st)st    
alternative (st)st   
(73) Q  ((st)st)t 
 some(Q) (st)st 
 some  (((st)st)t)(st)st 
 some = λQλdλw∃ψ[Q(ψ) ∧ ψ (d)(w)] 
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These definitions allow us to find some(Q) for the Q corresponding to the 
alternatives in (73): 
(74) some(Q) = λdλw[d(w) ∧ rainw]. 
Now we can check whether a particular global common ground c0 satisfies the 
pragmatic presupposition generated with L.  We read off the global-to-local 
function λcλw[c(w) ∧ rainw] from the representation (71).  That function is 
applied to c0, to find the local context λw[c0(w) ∧ rainw] for the clause which 
introduces the alternative set.  Finally, that the local context entails the disjunction 
of the alternatives is tested by checking whether updating with some(Q) 
eliminates any worlds.   
(75) some(Q)(local context)  = some(Q)(λw[c0(w) ∧ rainw]) 
    = λw[d(w) ∧ rainw] (λw[c0(w) ∧ rainw]) 
    = λw[c0(w) ∧ rainw ∧ rainw]  
    = λw[c0(w) ∧ rainw] 
    = local context 
No worlds are eliminated, so in this case any c0 satisfies the presupposition.  This 
verifies that the pragmatic presupposition produced by enrichment reasoning 
using L is in this case a trivial one.  Speaking loosely, we could say that the 
pragmatic presupposition some(Q) has been compositionally filtered.  But as was 
stated in section 9, the logic is really that the pragmatic presupposition which is 
generated in the first place is a trivial one.  Another way of looking at the result is 
that any use of (63) is one which is in agreement with default generalization L. 
What information is used in this pragmatic derivation?  When I read off the 
global-to-local function, I looked at the expressions to the left of  ‘+ψ know’ in the 
lambda term at the top of the tree in (71).   This procedure referred to the syntax 
of the lambda term at the root node, and it would not be possible to find the 
global-to-local function using only the semantic object named by that lambda 
term.  Notice that part of the structure which was used came from the lexical entry 
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of know.  If one wanted to restate the procedure in semantic terms, one would 
have to refer to structured propositions in the sense of Lewis (1972), or in fact 
structured dynamic propositions.  And the structuring would have to extend into 
lexical entries. 
So the analysis has both classic and non-classic features.  The classic ones are: 
Stalnaker’s definition of pragmatic presupposition is preserved; there are no 
pragmatic presuppositions or conversational implicatures in embedded positions; 
conversational reasoning operates with the output of compositional semantics; 
and there is a calculation of the presupposition as a conversational implicature. 
The non-classic feature is that for the derivation to work, more than just the 
semantic object (proposition or file change potential) denoted by a sentence has to 
be visible to the pragmatics.  To apply L, one has to be able to find the local 
context d which corresponds to a given global context c.  So the compositional 
semantics has to make available a correspondence between global and local 
information contexts. I conjectured that this can be accomplished with a 
structured meaning. 
I do not find this change in the semantics-pragmatics interface necessarily 
objectionable, because I assume that speakers have some kind of access to the LFs 
of the sentences they use, which gives some kind of indirect access to structured 
meanings.  But certainly, the new model should be recognized as a less 
constrained one, because it allows for the pragmatics to do more, and in 
particular, it allows enrichment reasoning to exploit a larger class of default 
generalizations. 
 
 
11.  The filtering argument for focus existential presupposition 
 
Section 6 said that focus (as analyzed in alternative semantics) is a soft 
trigger.  In the version of alternative semantics from Rooth (1992), the semantics 
of the focus feature F in a logical form contributes an alternative set Q, without 
any semantic presupposition that some element of Q is true.  But the assumption 
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some(Q) can be added by pragmatic enrichment, by the same logic which applies 
to lexically triggered alternative sets. 
In studies of the semantics of focus, there is an argument about whether the 
semantics of focus includes a semantic presupposition some(Q).  I already 
mentioned Rooth (1999), who claimed that there is no semantic existential 
presupposition, because the presupposition some(Q) is context-dependent and 
cancelable.   
Recently, the question has been raised again by Geurts and van der Sandt 
(2004), who argue for a semantic existential presupposition of focus.  They give a 
new argument for this position based on projection behavior, based on example 
(76).  Just as the presupposition that Fred has a wife is filtered in (76a), they 
observe, the presupposition that someone stole the tarts is filtered in (76b). 
 
(76) a.  If Fred has a wife, then Fred’s wife stole the tarts. 
b. If someone stole the tarts, then [Fred’s wife]F stole the tarts. 
 
The point can be strengthened by constructing an example where the 
existential presupposition is conditionalized, rather than completely filtered. In 
(77a), the presupposition that someone opened the vault is weakened to (77b).  
This weakened presupposition might be satisfied because it is taken for granted 
that the Trust Company keeps all its money and valuables in the vault, so that it 
could not be robbed without the vault being opened.   
 
(77) a.  If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then sheF opened the 
vault. 
b.  If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then someone opened 
the vault. 
c.  If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then it was she who 
opened the vault. 
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Notice that the same conditional weakening is seen with the cleft in (77c).  It 
is usually claimed that clefts have semantic existential presuppositions (e.g. 
Karttunen and Peters 1979 and Rooth 1999), so in the presupposition projection 
seen in conditionals, focus is similar to the cleft. 
The conditional weakening data for focus and the parallel behavior of the cleft 
seem to favor the view that focus is associated with a semantic existential 
presupposition, because projection behavior is parallel to what is seen in clear 
cases of semantic presuppositions.  This is Guerts and van der Sandt’s argument. 
The argument about focus that I have gone through, which seems to favor a 
analysis with a semantic existential presupposition for focus, is parallel to the 
argument regarding soft triggers presented in section 9, where it was observed 
that projection behavior for soft triggers such as stop was the same as the 
projection behavior seen with hard triggers.  Since focus is now being analyzed as 
a soft trigger, the same solution using dynamic semantics should work as a 
response to the Geurts and van der Sandt’s argument. 
It is appropriate to apply the analysis by referring to the focus interpretation 
operator rather than the focus feature itself, because it is the focus interpretation 
operator which introduces the alternative set.  And so, strictly speaking, it is the 
focus interpretation operator which is a soft trigger.  In the representation (78),  
the focus interpretation operator is adjoined to the main clause, so that Q is 
constrained to be a set of propositions of the form ‘x opened the vault’. 
 
(78) If Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company, then [[sheF opened the 
vault]~Q] 
 
The generalization which supports a derivation of a pragmatic presupposition is 
(79).  It is a special case of the generalization L, which I claimed applied to all 
soft triggers.  When (78) is used in a context with common ground c, an 
enrichment implicature that c is typical in the sense of (79) is generated.  By 
working through the compositional semantics which determines d in terms of c, 
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we obtain the constraint (80a) on c.  Since Q is the alternative set described in 
(80b), this is equivalent to the weakened presupposition (77b). 
 
(79) Typically, when a sentence ψ which embeds a structure [ϕ~Q] is used in a 
global context c, the corresponding local context d for [ϕ~Q] satisfies 
d⊧some(Q). 
(80) a.  c⊧  [Abner and Lana robbed the Trust Company → some(Q)] 
         b.  Q  =  {p| ∃x[p = x robbed the Trust Company]} 
 
The result of this investigation is that the pragmatic derivation of focus existential 
presuppositions, in its dynamic version, predicts the filtering behavior seen in (76) 
and (77).  So, contrary to Geurts and van der Sandt’s conclusion, to cover these 
data it is not necessary to assume that focus directly expresses an existential 
presupposition.   
 
 
12. Outlook 
 
In this section, I will mention possible extensions and revisions of my proposal, 
without going into any depth about them. 
My analysis had two parts.  In sections 5, I presented the idea that soft triggers 
introduce alternatives, and suggested that these were responsible for a pragmatic 
presupposition (specifically, the disjunction of the alternatives).  Sections 8 and 9 
actually derived a pragmatic presupposition, using enrichment reasoning.  The 
two parts are linked by the default generalization L, which refers to logical forms 
with alternative sets.  
The two parts are separable.   If we concentrate on one soft trigger (let’s say 
know) the second part of the analysis requires the generalization (81), which here 
is formulated to omit reference to alternative sets. 
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(81) If ψ is uttered in a context with informational ground c and ψ embeds a 
clause φ of the form x knows p, then typically c is such that the 
corresponding local context d for φ entails p.  
If (81) was true for some other reason independent of alternative sets, then the 
second part of the analysis (including the part about compositional transformation 
of presuppositions) would still go through.  Maybe (81) is just a statistical 
generalization, which is known by people and therefore can be used as a basis for 
enrichment reasoning.  After all, all kinds of specific facts like the fact that keys 
are usually used to open doors are supposedly a basis for enrichment reasoning.  
And people are good at noticing specific generalizations and using them in 
everyday life – maybe better than they are at noticing general generalizations.  I 
think this alternative line of analysis could be taken seriously.  And consequently,   
the second part of the theory (the part about the pragmatic derivation and filtering 
effects) should be considered the deeper one. 
I do however find the idea that lexical alternatives are involved in the data I 
have been analyzing compelling.  In section 5, I said that the alternatives were 
lexically stipulated.  This move is necessary to make the distinction between know 
and be right.  But it could be that the full story is some mixture of lexical 
stipulation and pragmatic inference.  In literature on focus, it is commonly 
observed that alternatives to focused items may be pragmatically determined, 
based on fit with the context.  The same factor could be at play in alternatives for 
soft triggers. This suggests the possibility that different pragmatic presuppositions 
(coming from different contextually determined alternative sets) could show up in 
different contexts. 
If one stays with the idea that alternatives are lexically specified, the natural 
place to try to give more substance to the lexical stipulation is in morphology.  
Throughout the paper, in the semantics I have effectively been working with a 
decomposed lexical entry for know, which analyzes “x know p” as “p is right (i.e. 
true) and x believes p”.   This suggests that morphologically, know is a compound 
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of two roots.   Suppose the overt root √know is a near synonym of believe, while a 
root RIGHT with semantics λp[p is right] is null.   Second, suppose that alternatives 
are generated in the position of the overt root, by negating it.  This would explain 
why “p is right” remains constant in the alternative.  The predicate “be right” 
would be complementary, with √right as the overt  root, and BELIEVE being a null 
root, which either is a compound with √right, or comes from somewhere else in 
the syntax.  These ideas are summarized below. 
(82)            Morphology  Alternative 
know [√know RIGHT] [[NOT √know] RIGHT] 
be right [BELIEVE √right] [BELIEVE [NOT √right]] 
I did not investigate the question of whether all alternatives can generate 
pragmatic presuppositions.  In some sense, man is an alternative to woman, and 
this contrast is culturally, psychologically and perhaps linguistically enshrined.  
But this contrast seems not to generate pragmatic presuppositions, in the absence 
of focus: 
(83) If John is living with a woman, Mary won’t continue to be interested in 
him. 
In the absence of focus, I think there is no tendency at all for this sentence to 
presuppose that John is living with a man or woman.  
Lastly, the hypothesis that soft triggers introduce alternatives would be 
strengthened if it could be shown that alternatives are used in other pragmatic 
ways.   Perhaps (84), which is a sentence used by Senator Feinstein of California, 
is an example of this kind. 
(84)  The committee's report does not acknowledge that the intelligence 
estimates were shaped by the administration. In my view, this remains an 
open question that needs more careful scrutiny.  
(85) shows how the example works out on my analysis.  In the understood 
context, p is not really presupposed, because Senator Feinstein says in the next 
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sentence that p is an open question.  However, she seems to be making some 
modalized suggestion, such that p might be true, or p is probably true. 
(85) p =  the intelligence estimates were shaped by the administration 
assertion:   p ∧ the report says p 
alternative: p ∧ ¬ the report says p 
some(Q) = p 
13. Conclusion 
This paper has proposed an articulated theory of presupposition triggering and 
projection for a group of “soft” presupposition triggers including intonational 
focus and the verbs stop, know, and win.  It is hypothesized that soft triggers 
introduce sets of propositions called alternative sets into grammatical 
representations.  Second, a default generalization L is hypothesized about 
alternative sets, global common grounds, and the local information states made 
available by compositional semantics.  A general pragmatic process of enrichment 
reasoning generates an implicature using L and logical forms with alternative sets, 
which is the observed pragmatic presupposition of sentences embedding soft 
triggers.  The implicature is a pragmatic presupposition, because it is a constraint 
on the common ground for a conversation.  Because of the default character of L, 
the implicature is suspendable.  Because L refers to information about local 
information states provided by compositional semantics, the derivation predicts 
compositional transformation of presuppositions.  At the same time, the derivation 
evades the paradox of compositional semantics transforming a pragmatically 
generated implicature.  The implicature which is generated by pragmatic 
enrichment reasoning using L is compositionally sensitive, and so strictly 
speaking, there is no process of an output of the pragmatic module being 
transformed by the compositional-semantic module of grammar.        
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Endnotes 
 
 
*This paper was born in a course on Pragmatics I taught at Cornell in 2001, where 
we looked at classical literature on presupposition.  An earlier paper, with part of 
the material presented here, was presented at SALT XII, and appeared as Abusch 
(2002).  The current paper was presented at the Workshop on Information 
Structure in Bad Teinach, July 2004, in a colloquium at MIT in November 2004, 
and in a colloquium at Tel Aviv University in January 2005.  Thanks to the 
audiences on these occasions.  I would like to thank Mats Rooth for 
accompanying various stages of this paper, and providing me with extensive and 
valuable criticisms and observations.  I would also like to thank David Beaver, 
Cleo Condoravdi, Pauline Jacobson and Sally McConnell-Ginet for comments 
and references.  I am solely responsible for any errors or misconceptions.  
1 Both versions are a naive lexical semantics for know, since they do not entail 
anything about the source of x’s belief that p.  I hope this does not affect the 
arguments I will make, but it might. 
2 The default account of semantic presuppositions which I have in mind is Heim’s 
file change theory, Heim (1983).  In the beginning part of the paper this is not 
important, but  in section 8, I will make crucial use of a dynamic compositional 
semantics.  The framework for pragmatic presupposition which is assumed 
throughout is the one proposed in Stalnaker (1974). 
3 Negative polarity either is exemplified in John didn’t attend either.  There are 
examples of suspension with it-clefts, but I assume these have a different 
character, involving discourse subordination.  See Chierchia and McConnell-
Ginet (1990) for discussion of the following example. 
A. Was it you who let the cat out the back door? 
B. No, it wasn’t me who did it, because I haven’t been in the kitchen.  And it 
wasn’t Sally who did it, because she just arrived.  In fact I suspect nobody 
did it.  The cat sometimes gets out through the window.   
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4 Or if both hard and soft triggers have semantics presuppositions (or if neither 
do), one has to find another explanation for the difference in suspendability.  Bill 
Ladusaw (in a question after my talk at SALT XII) and Mats Rooth independently 
pointed out to me that most  hard triggers are adverbs which express no meaning 
apart from the presupposition.  Here is one way of making something of this in an 
account which assumes semantic presuppositions for both soft and hard triggers. 
To use one of these presuppositional adverbs, while intending a representation 
where the presupposition is locally accommodated and thereby turning the 
presupposition into an assertion, is a very indirect and complicated way of 
introducing asserted information. Because they are so indirect and complicated, 
such representations are not used.  Another point is that most or all hard triggers 
associate with focus.  Maybe the fact that the focus itself requires a contrasting 
antecedent places additional constraint on the representation, with the effect 
(somehow) that it is harder to suspend the presupposition.  Abbott (2004) and 
Beaver (2004), which react to or build on Abusch (2002), discuss hypotheses 
along such general lines. 
5 Kadmon (2001) takes a different position:  she argues, first, that it is hard to 
draw a clean line between hard and soft triggers, and second, that it does not 
matter much for theoretical issues like presupposition filtering and 
accommodation whether presuppositions are semantically or pragmatically 
triggered.  See the second half of Section 9 for discussion of the latter point.  
6 Fillmore (1971) points out similar pairs, such as accuse and criticize, which 
have assertions and presuppositions permuted in various ways.  I think none of his 
examples are completely symmetric. 
7 Notice that the facts are different if sell has a contrastive stress.  In this case, A 
can be understood as conveying (and in fact, presupposing) that ownership of the 
bike went from John to Bill.  I discuss such data in section 6. 
8 Actually, it is not clear that the definite description is a hard trigger, since it’s 
presupposition is suspendable, as has frequently been noted: 
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(i) It is not true that John’s girlfriend does not like his children, because he has 
none. 
If the definite description has the properties of a soft trigger, this is an apparent 
problem or gap in my analysis, because no analysis for definite descriptions using 
alternative sets suggests itself.  See Abbott (2004) for some further discussion. 
9I am deliberately calling this phenomenon a transformation of presuppositions, 
rather than filtering, because this better describes our current understanding of the 
phenomenon.  The filtering terminology does not apply well to all cases, for 
instance to the presupposition-projection behavior of believe (see Heim 1991 and 
Section 10).   
10The twins examples are from Heim (1983), who attributes them to personal 
communication from Stanley Peters.  Although the scenario is not the most 
natural one, I find the judgments clear.   
11 There is work to do in making this representation semantically sensible, since 
the values for Q have to be allowed to vary with the choices of x2.  I expect that 
this can be resolved by quantifying Q inside the scope of everyone, perhaps with 
an existential quantifier. 
12 Notice that, although I used lexical alternatives to obtain (54), at this point in 
the argument, the important thing is that in typical uses, the global context c is 
such that the corresponding local context for the soft trigger entails the 
presupposition of the soft trigger.  The argument would work just as well if there 
were another reason for this, which did not have to do with alternatives.  For 
aspectual verbs like stop, and in fact for all soft triggers which entail a change of 
state, I think there is another possibility, which uses the fact that we are better 
informed about the past than the future.  One could try to argue that, in typical 
uses of John stopped smoking (at r), it is common ground whether John smoked 
before r or not, simply because people are typically well-informed about facts up 
to a certain point in time.  
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13 See section 10 for an example of such a function from local to global contexts, 
and of how this function is involved in the pragmatic derivation. 
14 This formulation has to be so complicated because utterances of sentences with 
semantic presuppositions are typically accompanied by pragmatic 
presuppositions.  Pragmatic presuppositions with this origin would automatically 
be compositionally transformed (or have the appearance of it), because the 
semantic presupposition is compositionally transformed. 
15 In my notation there is association to the right, so (st)st is grouped as (st)(st), 
and so is the type label of a function from information states to information states. 
For readers who prefer type labels written with commas and more brackets, the 
type label for some in that notation is  〈〈〈〈s,t〉,〈s,t〉〉,t〉,〈〈s,t〉,〈s,t〉〉〉.     
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